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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the financial coffers of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), affiliated universities, and sports media
conglomerates have grown considerably while the student-athlete has not
been able to cash-in on this lucrative enterprise. During the 2014 fiscal
year, the NCAA reported revenue of almost $1 billion.2 ESPN/ABC, CBS,
and Turner Sports are consistently paying hundreds of millions of dollars to
obtain licensing rights to broadcast NCAA contests.3 Revenue-generating
coaches at top programs around the country are increasingly signing multi-
million dollar contracts.4 By touting itself as having the "best business
model in the world," the NCAA is using the argument of preserving the
integrity and competitive balance of major college sports as a shield to
protect athletes from the commercial influences and potentiality of losing
their amateur status.
With the rising costs and the time pressures of major college athletics,
the demands on student-athletes have increased exponentially.5 In addition
to the demands required of every student at a particular university, the
athlete faces additional challenges regular students may not face. The
guarantee of a one-year scholarship to cover only tuition, room and board,
and books does not leave room in the budget for an occasional trip to the
I J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class of 2017.
2 National Collegiate Athletic Association and Subsidiaries Consolidated Financial
Statements, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2014-
15NCAA FinancialStatement.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter NCAA
Consolidated Financial Statements] (stating that in the 2014 fiscal year, the NCAA's total
revenue was $989 million).
' See CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14- Year Agreement,
http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketbal-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-tumer-broadcasting-ncaa-
reach-14-year-agreement (last visited Apr. 1, 2016); see also Jerry Hinnen, ESPN reaches
12-year deal to air college football playoffs, CBS SPORTS,
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/21083689/espn-reaches-
I 2year-deal-to-air-college-football-playoffs (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
4 See generally Allie Grasgreen, Coaches Make More than You, INSIDE HIGHER ED,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/11/07/football-coach-salaries- 10-percent-over-
last-year-and-top-5-million (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (stating that head football coach
salaries at major NCAA programs are up 10% over the last year and 90% since 2006).
1 See generally Ryan Piurek, IU Student-Athletes Face their Biggest Foe: Time, INDIANA
UNIVERSITY TEACHING & LEARNING,
http://www.indiana.edu/-tandlpub/story.php?storyid=73 (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
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movie theater, splurging on a pizza, or the ability to travel home on the
weekend or during school breaks.6 Because of the demands placed on these
athletes, there is little time left for the pursuit of part-time employment to
supplement the scholarship and provide a source of income. With no source
of income, athletes are confronted with the temptation of receiving illegal
compensation from boosters, agents, and other related entities that could
leave their remaining eligibility hanging in the balance.
While the goal of the NCAA's amateurism rules may be to preserve
amateurism and maintain the competitive balance, the NCAA has been
engaging in anti-competitive conduct in violation of Section I of the
Sherman Act.7 This note seeks to examine the NCAA's traditional role in
college athletics, the changing landscape of college athletics, and whether
the NCAA's restraint on a student-athlete's ability to be compensated for
his or her athletic ability and performance violates antitrust laws.
Specifically, this note will explore the O'Bannon litigation's impact on the
NCAA model.8
Part I1 of this note examines the history of the NCAA model and the
justifications the NCAA uses to legitimize its endeavor. By using NCAA
antitrust litigation, Part Ill explains the relationship between the NCAA and
antitrust regulation, including why the NCAA's restraint on the student-
athlete's ability to be compensated is a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Part IV discusses the NCAA's historical use of a player's likeness and
the implications of the landmark O'Bannon decision. Part V provides
possible solutions to the NCAA's restrictions on a player's ability to use his
or her likeness and proposes the most feasible solution. Part VI sets forth a
brief discussion on the future of intercollegiate athletics.
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK INTO THE NCAA
The NCAA is comprised of "[m]ore than 1,200 schools, conferences,
and affiliate organizations" and offers "opportunities to participate in 89
championship events."9 First chartered in 1905 by trustees of sixty-two
colleges as a coalition to discuss the health risks associated with
intercollegiate sports and advocate for reform,'0 the NCAA is a
6 Michelle Hill, 3 Points for Paying College Athletes, Sports Networker,
http://www.sportsnetworker.com/2010/03/22/3-points-for-paying-college-athletes/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2016).
7 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
8 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
9 Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaaorglabout/who-we-are/membership (last visited
Apr. 1, 2016).
10 See generally Howard J. Savage, American College Athletics 13-29 (1929) (discussing
how violence in college athletics during the late 19th and early 20th centuries led to the
NCAA's formation); see also Frank W. Carsonie, Comment, Educational Values: A
Necessity for Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 661, 667
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"membership-driven organization dedicated to safeguarding the well-being
of student-athletes and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the
playing field, in the classroom, and throughout life."' 1 Its mission is to
promulgate rules and regulations, host championship contests, enforce
standards of academic eligibility, and promote the general growth and
welfare of college athletics. 12 NCAA goals include enriching the college
experience of student-athletes by integrating athletics and higher education,
promoting and developing educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics
excellence, and athletics participation as a recreational pursuit.' 3 To achieve
these goals, NCAA members, mostly colleges and universities, but also
conferences and affiliated groups, work together to create the framework of
rules for fair and safe competition. 4
Since 1973, NCAA member schools have been organized into three
divisions- Divisions I, II, III--- to create a fair playing field for similar
institutions and provide student-athletes with opportunities to participate in
championship events.'5 The differences among the divisions are primarily
as a result of how schools chose "to fund their athletic programs and in the
national attention that they command."' 16 Division I consists of the schools
with the largest student bodies, largest athletic budgets, and the ability to
provide students with the most opportunities for athletic participation. 7 To
qualify for membership in Division I, a school must sponsor at least
fourteen varsity sports (seven for men and seven for women), including
football and must meet minimum financial aid award requirements for the
athletics program.' 8 Membership in Division I is partially predicated on
(1991); see also Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 Yale L.J.
655, 656 n.5 (1978).
II About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
12 Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA's
No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 61, 65 (citing
Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the NCAA "promulgates rules and regulations" pertaining to college
sports)); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th
Cir. 1983) (describing the NCAA as "essentially an integration of the rulemaking and rule-
enforcing activities of its member institutions"), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Gaines
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (explaining that according to the
NCAA's constitution, its purpose is to maintain amateur athletics "as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.").
13 About the NCAA, supra note 11.14 1d.
1" Id.; see also Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification,
NCAA, http://www.ncaaorg/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-
history-multidivision-classification (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
6 About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d2 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2016).17 NCAA Division 1, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division-dl (last visited Apr. 1,
2016).
1s Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, supra note 15.
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football sponsorship within two subdivisions - Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) and Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). 19 Unlike at FCS
schools, which are further limited in the amount of financial aid awards,
FBS schools may offer up to 85 full scholarships. 20 As a result of the
increased scholarship opportunities, the level of competition tends to be
higher, and highly-touted recruits tend to accept FBS offers.2 1
In addition to the football subdivisions, Division I is further divided
into conferences. These conferences typically have their own membership
requirements that operate alongside NCAA rules and regulations. 22
Conferences, on behalf of member schools, organize conference games and
championship tournaments, 23 negotiate multi-million dollar television
broadcasting deals,24 and advocate for modification of NCAA rules.
Division II provides "thousands of student-athletes the opportunity to
compete at a high level of scholarship athletics while excelling in the
classroom and fully engaging in the broader campus experience., 26 The
balance between athletics contributions and campus/community
involvement is one philosophical difference between it and Division 1.27
Division II's financial aid model is a mix of partial athletic scholarships,
merit and academic awards, need-based grants, and/or employment
earnings.28 Finally, Division III offers participation in a "competitive
athletic environment that pushes student-athletes to excel on the field and
build upon their potential by tackling new challenges across campus.', 29 As
evidenced by Division III's shorter practice and playing seasons and
regional competition sites, academics are the primary focus for Division II
student-athletes. °
19 NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division-dl (last visited Apr. 1,
2016).
20 John Solomon, NCAA faces new suit over number, length offootball scholarships, CBS
SPORTS, http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24691 100/ncaa-
faces-another-lawsuit-over-number-length-of-football-scholarships (last visited May 4,
2016).
21 O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 966 (2014).
22See generally About the Conference, BIG 10, http://www.bigten.org/school-bio/bigl0-
school-bio.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
23 Id.
24 Chris Smith, The Most Valuable Conferences in College Sports 2014, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/20 14/04/i 5/the-most-valuable-conferences-in-
college-sports-2014/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
25 Sharon Terlep, NCAA Votes to Give Big Conferences More Autonomy, WALL STREET
JouRNAL, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ncaa-votes-to-give-big-conferences-more-autonomy-
1407433146 (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
26 About NCAA Division I!, supra note 16.27 Id.
28Id.
29 About NCAA Division 111, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d3 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2016).
30 Id.
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One of the NCAA's key rules seeks to preserve amateurism and protect
student-athletes from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises. 3' In attempting to preserve student-athlete amateurism, the
NCAA prohibits student-athletes from receiving any form of payment for
their athletic ability in their respective sports.32 Additionally, student-
athletes may not accept any promises of future payment to be received after
graduation, including payments based on the use of their name, likeness,
and images.33 NCAA-member universities are, however, permitted to "use a
student-athlete's name, picture or appearance to support its charitable or
educational activities," as long as, among other requirements, it is not used
to promote commercial ventures of a non-profit agency.3" Member
universities are also permitted to sell items with names, likenesses, and/or
pictures of multiple student-athletes.35  Items that only include an
"individual student-athlete's name, likeness, and/or picture.. .may not be
sold. 36 Before the O'Bannon case was brought before a district court in
California, NCAA policy did not address the use of student-athletes'
likenesses in Electronic Arts' videogames.
37
The NCAA also required all student-athletes to sign a series of
documents before participating in intercollegiate athletics. 38  The
documents, including Form 08-3a, authorized the NCAA, or a third-party
organization acting on behalf of the NCAA, to use the student-athlete's
name or picture to "generally promote NCAA championships or other
NCAA events, activities or programs. '39 Though not expressly stated on the
forms, the NCAA's stance is that this form forces student-athletes to
"relinquish in perpetuity all future rights in the NCAA's licensing of their
images and likenesses." 40
31 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Division I Manual, 2015-2016 NCAA Division I Manual §
12.5.2.1 (2015), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D I 16.pdf
[hereinafter NCAA Division I Manual].32 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.1.2.
33 Id.34 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.1.1.
35 Id. at § 12.5.1.1(h)
36 Id.
37 See Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, E4 Sports,
and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 23-31
(analyzing the issues of Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.).
38 Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust Case,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/more-sports/2009/07/21/ncaa (last visited Apr. 1,
2016).39 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5. 1. 1. 1; see also Dan Wolken & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA
Removes Name-Likeness Release from Student-Athlete Forms, USA TODAY SPORTS,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/07/18/ncaa-name-and-likeness-release-
student-athlete-statement-form/12840997/ (discussing the NCAA eliminating Form 08-3a as
a required form before participating in intercollegiate athletics) (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
0 McCann, supra note 38.
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For fiscal year 2014, the NCAA alone generated $989 million in total
revenue. 4 1 Most of the revenue generated came from media and marketing
rights agreements with Turner Broadcasting and CBS associated with the
Division I NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament, which inevitably included
the ability for the networks to use student-athletes' names, likenesses, and
images during the telecasts and promotion of the event.42 The revenue
figure included an $80.5 million surplus, year-end net assets of $708
million, and a $59 million increase of the endowment fund. 3 The NCAA
also distributed $547.1 million to Division I schools and conferences.' The
revenue distribution was broken down into the following categories and
percentages: basketball fund (39%), grant-in-aid (26%), student assistance
(15%), sports sponsorship (13%), academic enhancement (5%), and
conference grants (2%). 45
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE NCAA
As the seminal case in NCAA antitrust litigation, the Supreme Court's
1984 decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma46 guided subsequent federal judges' analysis and interpretation
of antitrust claims against the NCAA 7 Decisions gave deference to the
NCAA's theory of amateurism and desire to maintain a competitive
balance. 8
A. Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act
Section I of the Sherman Act stipulates that any "contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." '49 Section I also provides for a "comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule[s] of trade."50 By allowing the unrestrained interaction of trade,
" NCAA Consolidated Financial Statements, supra note 2.
42 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY
SPORTS, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/1 I/ncaa-financial-statement-
2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/ (Mar. It, 2015).
43 Id.
44Id.
4 5 NCAA Revenue Distribution Plan, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2013-
1 4%20Revenue%20Distribution%2OPlan.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
4 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
4' Edelman, supra note 12 at 79-86 (discussing how district courts differentiate between
NCAA rules that affect trade or commerce, and therefore subject to antitrust scrutiny, and
those that affect eligibility).
48 Id.
49 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
1°N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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"competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material
progress., 51 In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court interpreted the act to
only prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade because in a sense every
contract is a restraint on trade.52 To prevail on a claim under Section 1, a
plaintiff must prove three elements.53 First, a plaintiff must show that there
was a contract, combination, or conspiracy.54 Second, a plaintiff must show
that the agreement at issue unreasonably restrained trade within any
relevant market under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason
analysis. 55 Finally, a plaintiff must show that the restraint affected interstate
commerce. 56 Ultimately, the Supreme Court has stated that the act is "aimed
. . . [at restraints] comparable to restraints deemed illegal at common law,
although accomplished by means other than contract which, for
constitutional reasons, are confined to transactions in or which affect
interstate commerce., 57 The Court has also stated that even non-profit
organizations such as the NCAA may be subjected to antitrust scrutiny,
insofar as its commercial activities.
58
B. The Tests ofAntitrust Analysis
Through established NCAA rules, member institutions have "banded
together to fix the amount of compensation they will pay college athletes..
. . [D]eny[ing] student-athletes a fair share of the revenue[] they
generate., 59 Even though NCAA rules on compensating athletes "restrain
competition among member institutions, depress student-athlete
compensation, and [may] result in resource misallocation," it does not
automatically result in the violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.60 The
court will analyze the challenged restraints under aper se analysis or a rule
of reason analysis.
61
The rule of reason is the presumptive or default standard the court will
use to make a determination into the legality of the challenged rules.62 A
restraint is unreasonable and violates the rule of reason if "the restraint's
51 Id.
52 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
53 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 982, 993-94 (1940).58 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
59 Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299,
1300 (1992).
60 Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 206, 212 (1990).
61 Id. at 219-20.
62 California ex reL. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011).
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harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects. 6 3 In addition to
being reluctant to adopt per se rules with regard to "restraints imposed in
the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain
practices is not immediately obvious,"64 the Supreme Court has held that
collective decisions by third-party intermediaries and joint ventures are still
concerted actions subjected to Section I scrutiny.65
If, upon first impression, the court believes that the restraint is likely to
have some competitive benefit, then it analyzes the restraint under a rule of
reason analysis.6 6 When analyzing a restraint's reasonableness, the initial
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the "restraint produces 'significant
anticompetitive effects' within a 'relevant market.',6 7 The rule of reason
test "distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect[s] that are
harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in
the consumer's best interest.'68 It requires investigating every aspect of a
restraint, including whether the parties to the restraint had the power to
control any relevant market, whether the restraint encourages or suppresses
competition, and whether the restraint caused the marketplace
anticompetitive harm.69 A relevant market
[E]ncompasses notions of geography as well as product
use, quality, and description. The geographic market
extends to the "'area of effective competition' . . . where
buyers can turn for alternate sources of supply."70 The
product market includes the pool of goods or services that
63 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (citing Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference,
101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
6 FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
61 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202-03 (2010) ("When
'restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,' per se rules of
illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible
Rule of Reason." (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984))); see also Id. at 117 ("Our decision not to apply aper se rule to this case rests in
large part on our recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved.");
see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) ("Joint
ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful... where the
agreement... is necessary to market the product at all.").
I See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985-87 (N.D. Cal. 2014), affd in part,
vacated in part sub nom., 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
67 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (citing Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference,
101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
6 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
6 Edelman, supra note 12 at 74.
70 Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Moore v. Jas.
H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977)) (defining the area of the relevant
geographic market).
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enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-
elasticity of demand.7 '
Alleged relevant markets may survive antitrust scrutiny because their
validity is normally a factual element rather than a legal element.
72
"The rule of reason does not govern all restraints., 73 Certain restraints
are deemed unreasonable, eliminating the need to conduct a rule of reason
analysis. 74 This is because the restraint is automatically presumed to
suppress competition without engaging in any further inquiry. 5 Resorting
to the per se rules is "confined to restraints . . . that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output., 76 Restraints that
have "manifestly anticompetitive" 77 effects and "lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use. 78 As such, a per se rule analysis is only
appropriate after courts have had considerable experience with the type of
restraint at issue, 79 and only if courts can predict with confidence that it
would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under a rule of reason
analysis.80
If a court applies a rule of reason analysis to determine whether a
restraint's harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects, then it
typically relies upon a burden-shifting framework.8' Under this framework,
the plaintiff "bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint produces
'significant anticompetitive effects' within the relevant product and
geographic markets. 8 2 If this initial burden is satisfied, "the defendant must
come forward with evidence of the restraint's procompetitive effects., 83 If
satisfied, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "show that any legitimate
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. 84
Most courts that apply the per se analysis do so in favor of the plaintiff
based on a preliminary finding of anticompetitive effects, relieving the
burden of establishing market power and shifting the burden to the
71 Id. (citing Syufy Enters. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1986)).
72 Newcal Indus., Inc. v. kon Office Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008).
7' Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 886.
74 Id. (explaining that "the per se rule, treating categories of restraint as necessarily illegal,
eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real
market forces at work.").
75 Id.
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
17 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
7 8 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
79 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).80 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
S1 Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id.
4 Id.
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defendant to provide justification. Nevertheless, several antitrust decisions
have found that courts may also analyze the restraint pursuant to the per se
rule in favor of defendants if it is "essential if the product is to be available
at all.
8 5
C. Antitrust Scrutiny and the NCAA
Antitrust plaintiffs have argued that restrictions on payments to student-
athletes are horizontal agreements restraining price competition, which is
per se unreasonable.86 Historically, courts have refused to apply the per se
test when analyzing allegations of NCAA antitrust violations because of the
NCAA's stated amateurism principles87 as well as the necessity of
horizontal restraints on competition if the product is to be available at all.88
Plaintiffs arguing before the court using the rule of reason test have
equally been unsuccessful. 89 The Court has stipulated that NCAA rules
render the organization as procompetitive and, as such, requires an analysis
under the rule of reason if the restraint is a "justifiable means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams," and therefore enhances public
interest in intercollegiate athletics.90
Historically, NCAA rules withstand antitrust violation claims if the rule
is to preserve the product of college sports in the economic marketplace. 91
The Court has reasoned that NCAA members "share an interest in making
the entire league successful and profitable," collectively benefiting from
colluding in the production and scheduling of games." 92
" Edelman, supra note 12 at 75; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (noting that horizontal restraints on competition are essential in some
industries).
86 Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 206, 219 (1990).
87 Tibor Nagy, The "Blind Look" Rule of Reason: Federal Courts' Peculiar Treatment of
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 339-343 (2005).
11 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101.
89 See id. at 117.
9 Id.
91 Id.
I Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010); see also Texaco,
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (stating that "[it is not] per se illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set the prices at which [it]
sells its products."); see also Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(noting that a "clear trend has emerged in recent years under which courts have been
extremely reluctant to subject the rules and regulations of sports organizations to the group
boycott per se analysis.").
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D. An Analysis of Court Decisions Reviewing NCAA Eligibility and
Antitrust Regulation
In one of the first lower court decisions regarding NCAA exemption
from antitrust regulations, the District of Massachusetts decided in Jones v.
NCAA the legality of the NCAA's no-pay rules.93 In Jones, the NCAA ruled
an ice hockey player ineligible for competition since the player had
previously received a stipend based on athletic ability.94 The court
concluded that the plaintiff could not challenge the NCAA's rule banning
the player because the plaintiff did not show how "the action[s] of the
[NCAA] in setting eligibility guidelines ha[d] any nexus to commercial or
business activities in which the defendant might engage. 95 In addition, the
court noted that even if the claim was not barred on noncommercial
grounds, the NCAA still did not act with sufficient "scienter" to violate
antitrust law.96
In 1984, the Supreme Court held in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma97 that limiting the number of games an NCAA
member may broadcast on television violated Section I of the Sherman Act
because it "eliminate[d] competitors from the [broadcast television]
market."98 At the district court level, the court held that the NCAA's
television bylaws represented an illegal restraint on output, and that the
NCAA, in its allocation of television rights, illegally "maintain[ed]
mechanisms for punishing cartel members who [sought] to stray from these
production quotas." 99 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concurring that "[t]he
television plan at issue . . .restrict[ed] the plaintiffs' revenues, market
share, and output,"'00 and further noting that "the television [plan's] ...
threat of expulsion and boycott [are] sanctions which clearly have
93 Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
94 Id. at 297-98.
95 Id. at 303.
96 Id at 304.97 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
98 Edelman, supra note 12 at 79 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. at 85, 108).
99 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1301 (W.D. Okla.
1982), af'd in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (1 0th Cir. 1983), affd, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (stating the district court found each of the other elements required under a full rule
of reason analysis were also met and concluding that the University of Oklahoma and the
University of Georgia suffered "antitrust harm" because they were able to show the
likelihood of lost revenues due to the television broadcast restraints); Id. at i 301-02, 1288
(concluding that such injuries are "direct and substantial, and not indirect or derivative of
injury alleged to have been suffered by the public at large" and that the NCAA exercised
"market power" in both a relevant market for college football television broadcasts and the
competition in college sports because, "[als a practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a
prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic program.")
10 Edelman, supra note 12 at 79; (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA,
707 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1983)).
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anticompetitive potential."'' ° As such, it appears that even if the NCAA
restraint had not affected output, the appellate court still would have found
the threat of ousting noncompliant members to require careful scrutiny
under a rule of reason analysis.
10 2
A subsequent decision in McCormack v. NCAA dealt with a college
football player's unsuccessful challenge to NCAA death penalty rules.
10 3
The player's challenge failed under the rule of reason analysis with the
court reasoning that eligibility rules, used to determine who can and cannot
participate in college football games, "enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics" and support an "academic tradition" and ultimately
are the foundation of the unique character of intercollegiate athletics."0 4
Using some of the same language as the Fifth Circuit in McCormack, the
Seventh Circuit described the plaintiff's antitrust claims in Banks v. NCAA
as "absurd" because, in the court's opinion, "the NCAA does not exist as a
minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide
an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a
collegiate education."
10 5
In the 1990 decision in Gaines v. NCAA, the Middle District of
Tennessee similarly held that a plaintiff wishing to return to college football
after entering the NFL draft could not bring an antitrust challenge against
106
the NCAA. The court noted a legal difference "between the NCAA's
efforts to restrict the televising of college football games and the NCAA's
efforts to maintain a discernible line between amateurism and
107
professionalism." Thus, the court adopted a bifurcated test to determine
whether NCAA conduct affects interstate commerce, placing "business
rules" (such as the television policy) on one side of a line and "eligibility
108
rules" (such as those related to amateurism) on the other side. Then in
1998, the Third Circuit formally adopted Gaines's two-prong test for
determining the commerciality of NCAA rules in another case, Smith v.
109
NCAA. Smith involved a plaintiff's challenge to an NCAA bylaw that
prohibited a student-athlete from participating in intercollegiate athletics
while attending a graduate school different from the one she attended for
I Edelman, supra note 12 at 79-80, 80 n. 85 ("[F]inding that plaintiffs' claim of an output
restraint was per se illegal, and their group boycott claim was subject to the full rule of
reason inquiry.") (citing Bd. of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1161).
'02 Bd of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1 161.
103 See generally McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988).104 Id.
lO1 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1992).
" Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
'I7 Id at 743.
'0Id. at 747.
'09 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (1998).
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I10
undergrad. Citing Jones and Gaines, the court found this particular bylaw
immune from antitrust scrutiny because "many district courts have
[already] held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA's
II
promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements."
After Smith, two other Third Circuit rulings found the NCAA's
eligibility rules to be noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. In Bowers v. NCAA, the District of New Jersey held that the
NCAA bylaws that determine academic eligibility lie outside the Sherman
Act's reach because Third Circuit precedent indicated that those bylaws are
"not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities."'112 Similarly,
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Pocono Invitational Sports
Camps v. NCAA that an NCAA bylaw allowing Division I coaches to
evaluate high school basketball players only at certified camps did not
violate antitrust law because the plaintiff did not show that the challenged
restraint involved "trade or commerce."
'1 13
In Bassett v. NCAA, the Sixth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's
precedent when it adopted a bifurcated test for evaluating whether NCAA
conduct is sufficiently commercial to fall within the scope of the Sherman
114
Act. The dispute in Bassett specifically involved the legality of an NCAA
mandate requiring that any college wishing to hire a coach who previously
engaged in recruiting violations to first receive permission from the NCAA
115
Committee on Infractions. Ultimately, the court found the rule was
noncommercial, meaning that there was no unlawful restraint, even though
116
the court acknowledged that the NCAA itself was a commercial actor. To
justify its decision, the court described the NCAA coaching restraint as
"anti-commercial" because, if not for the rule, any NCAA member that
wanted to hire a coach who had engaged in previous NCAA recruiting
infractions could obtain "a decided competitive advantage in recruiting and
117
retaining highly prized student athletes."
Taken individually, each of these previous decisions seems to present a
strong basis for finding the NCAA's restraint on compensating student-
athletes to be noncommercial and thus valid under Section I of the Sherman
110 See id.
I Id. at 185.
112 Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Smith v. NCAA, 139
F.3d at 185-86).
113 Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 581-84 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
114 Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
115 ld. at 431.
16 Id. at 433.
117 Id.
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Act. 8 Going forward, a plaintiff must show the court that the NCAA's
amateurism rules and procompetitive justifications are commercial, rather
than merely eligibility, rules in nature and therefore not sufficient to justify
the blanket prohibition on compensating student athletes.
IV. NCAA AND MEMBER-INSTITUTIONS USE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE'S
NAMES, IMAGES, AND LIKENESSES: THE O'BANNON DECISION
In 2009, Edward O'Bannon, a former student-athlete on the University
of California, Los Angeles men's basketball team from 1991 to 1995, filed
a class action complaint in the Northern District of California, on behalf of
himself and current and former student-athletes. 19 The remedies sought in
the O'Bannon complaint included monetary relief associated with the
NCAA's use and licenses of student-athlete's names, images, and
likenesses by the NCAA and other commercial enterprises. 20 If the
plaintiffs were to receive a favorable settlement, "the NCAA, along with its
member [institutions and conferences], could be required to pay tens of
millions, if not hundreds of millions, of dollars in damages."'' 21
O'Bannon argued that NCAA actions allowed the organization,
member-schools, and other commercial enterprises to use student-athlete's
names, images, and likenesses in live game telecasts, television re-
broadcasts, memorabilia, and videogames. 22 Because of NCAA rules,
current and former student-athletes could not receive compensation, beyond
the value of their athletic scholarship, based on the use of their names,
images, and likenesses, while the NCAA could be compensated.123 A
student-athlete is deemed ineligible to play if he or she were to use his or
her athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in his or her
sport. 24 O'Bannon's complaint was based on the legal theory alleging that
the NCAA had unlawfully restrained trade in violation of Section I of the
Sherman Act.125 In the absence of NCAA restraints, O'Bannon and other
student-athletes could collectively bundle their rights and sell them to the
NCAA, member-institutions, and other commercial enterprises. 26
118 Edelman, supra note 12 at 86.
.9 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
120 Christian Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O'Bannon v. NCAA on Appeal
and the Future of Intercollegiate Athletics, 93 N.C.L. REv. 90, 103 (2015).
121 McCann, supra note 37.
122 Steve Berkowitz, Amended 0 'Bannon Filing Has Highly Charged Allegations, USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/07/19/ncaa-ed-obannon-
lawsuit-amended-complaint-allegations-ea/2567367/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
123 Id.
124 See 2015-16NCAA Division I Manual § 12.11.4.2, at 88 (2015).
5 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
12 6 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
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After initial proceedings, including the district court's denial of the
NCAA's motion to dismiss127 and the plaintiffs being awarded class
certification, 28 Judge Claudia Wilken analyzed the case based on the
burden-shifting rule of reason analysis, despite the plaintiffs desire for the
restraint to be analyzed under a per se rule analysis.129 This was decided
because "courts have found that the NCAA's general restrictions on
student-athlete compensation could conceivably enhance competition,"
which under aper se analysis could be deemed necessarily illegal.130
There was no dispute among the NCAA and the plaintiffs in regards to
whether the rules were enacted and enforced pursuant to an agreement
among the NCAA, member institutions, and conferences,'13 or that the rules
affect interstate commerce. 32 The only issue is whether the restrictions
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
133
A. O'Bannon Rule of Reason Analysis
The two relevant markets identified by the plaintiffs as causing
anticompetitive effects are the "college education market," which colleges
and universities compete in to recruit student-athletes to play FBS football
or Division I basketball and the "group licensing market," in which
television networks, videogame developers, and other commercial
enterprises compete for group licenses to use the names, images, and
' See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d
996, 998-1006 (N.D. Cal. 2013). (following a more progressive view of NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla. by stating that the Supreme Court has "never examined whether or
not the ban on student-athlete compensation actually had a procompetitive effect on the
college sports market," Id. at 1002, Also the Sherman Act clearly applies to at least some of
the NCAA's behavior and the seminal case on the interaction between the NCAA and the
Sherman Act, implies that all regulations passed by the NCAA are subject to the Sherman
Act. Id. at 1004) (citing Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 338-39 (7th Cir. 2012)).
128 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126,
1153 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
129 Id. at 1136.
131 Id. at 1137. Under a traditional rule of reason review, "[t]he plaintiff bears the initial
burden of showing that the restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within [a]
relevant... marketal." Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
If the plaintiff satisfies the initial burden, "the defendant must come forward with evidence
of the restraint's Ucompetitive effects." Id. If the defendant produces this evidence, the
plaintiff must show that "any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner." Id.(citation omitted); see also Gabe Feldman, The Misuse of the Less
Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 Am. U. L. REv. 561, 563
(2009) (arguing that this additional prong adds confusion rather than clarity to the analysis).
131 See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (the first element of a
claim under Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act requires a plaintiff to demonstrate there
was a "contract, combination, or conspiracy."); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
at 99 ("NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint an agreement among
competitors on the way in which they will compete [against each other].").
'
32 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100.
133 Id. at 101.
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likenesses of FBS football or Division I men's basketball players in
broadcasts, videogames, and re-broadcasts.134 For the "college education
market," the court concluded that evidence of NCAA member-institutions'
agreement to charge football and men's basketball recruits the same price
for the bundle of educational and athletic opportunities that they offered,
i.e., a recruit's athletic services along with use of his name, image, and
likeness, while he was in school, constituted "restraint of trade.' 35 The
court also concluded that the evidence sufficiently established
anticompetitive effects on the "group licensing market" by providing
evidence from experts showing NCAA legislation prohibits videogame
producers and broadcasters from competing freely to offer licenses to
student-athletes for use of their names, images, and likenesses.136
B. NCAA Procompetitive Justifications
Since the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to show that NCAA
rules impose a restraint on competition in the "college education market,"
the burden then shifted to the NCAA to prove that the restraint is
justified.137 The NCAA asserted four procompetitive justifications for its
rules barring student-athletes from receiving compensation for the use of
their names, images, and likenesses: (1) preserving amateurism; (2)
maintaining the competitive balance among FBS football and Division I
basketball teams; (3) promoting the integration of academics and athletics;
and (4) the increasing the greater total output of its in the relevant
markets. 38
The NCAA asserted that challenged restraint promoted consumer
demand for its product by preserving its tradition of amateurism in college
sports.139 The court then went through an analysis of how the NCAA's
definition of amateurism has changed since 1906.140 Because of the changes
in rules and the inconsistencies in aid, the court concluded that NCAA
restrictions on student-athlete compensation, capping athletics-based
financial aid below the cost of attendance, are not justified by the definition
of amateurism. 14' The court did conclude, however, that restraints on
'14 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1136-
38.
135 Id. at 1137-38.
136 1d. at 1138.
137 Paladin Ass'n, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (2003) (in considering
the justifications, the court must determine whether the "anticompetitive aspects of the
challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects.").
131 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 - 81 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
139 Id. at 973-78.
" Id. at 973-75 (noting that initial NCAA rules, which would have barred the current
athletic scholarship, have changed many times since 1906 as well as inconsistencies in grant-
in-aid rules that allow student-athletes to accept Pell grants in excess of their cost of
attendance and tennis recruits to earn prize money).
141 Id. at 975.
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student-athlete compensation play a limited role in driving consumer
demand in FBS football and Division I basketball related products and
promoting amateurism.
142
The second justification asserted by the NCAA was that the restraints
are necessary to maintain a level of competitive balance among FBS
football and Division I basketball teams. 43 One of the plaintiff's witnesses,
Dr. Richard Noll, along with a number of sports economists found "little
evidence that the NCAA rules and regulations have promoted competitive
balance in college athletics . . ." 44 Additionally, evidence was offered to
show that the NCAA does not have rules in place to "rein in spending by
the high revenue schools or minimize existing disparities in revenue and
recruiting."' 145 These high revenue schools typically receive the highest
payouts, which hinders, rather than promotes, competitive balance. 146 As
such, the court concluded the NCAA's challenged restraints are not
necessary to achieve or maintain current levels of competitive balance.
47
The NCAA's third justification, that restraints on student-athlete
compensation promoted the integration of academics and athletics, was
supported through evidence from university administrators.' 48 They
"asserted that paying student-athletes large sums of money could
potentially 'create a wedge' between student-athletes and others on
campus.', 149 The district court concluded that some limitations to student-
athlete compensation may assist in integrating student-athletes into the
"academic communities of their schools, which may in turn improve the
schools' college education product."
150
The NCAA's final justification, which was rejected by the district
court, noted that the challenged restraints allow institutions to increase the
number of opportunities available to institutions and student-athletes to
participate in FBS football and Division I basketball, which in turn
increases the number of games that can be played.' 51 Again, the district
court rejected this justification for two main reasons. First, evidence was
presented to show that member-institutions have increasingly sought greater
autonomy from the NCAA to enact their own rules. 152 Second, because
current Division I institutions and conferences do not subsidize non-FBS
142 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
143 Id.
'4 O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978.
145 Id. at 978-79 (Dr. Mark Emmert conceded that it is "not the [NCAA's] mission to ... try
and take away the advantages of a university that's made a significant commitment to
facilities and tradition and all of the things that go along with building a program.").
146 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119.
147 Id.
148 O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980.
149 ld.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1003-04.
152 Id. at 1004.
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football or non-Division I basketball, it is difficult to make the connection
that the restraints to student-athlete compensation allow non-FBS football
or non-Division I basketball schools the ability to join the highest
divisions.
153
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives to NCAA Compensation Rules
After a determination that two of the procompetitive justifications
offered by the NCAA sufficiently supported an inference that some
restraints on student-athlete compensation may provide procompetitive
benefits, 5 ' the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to provide less restrictive
alternatives to achieve the same procompetitive effects.'55 The district court
concluded that the plaintiffs provided two less restrictive alternatives that
still allowed the NCAA to achieve its stated procompetitive goals. 56 The
first less restrictive alternative suggested that the NCAA could allow FBS
football and Division I basketball schools to award stipends to student-
athletes up to the full cost of attendance, as determined by NCAA bylaws
and individual member-institutions, to make up for any gaps in the
traditional grant-in-aid scholarship award.'57 The second less restrictive
alternative proposed that the NCAA permit member-institutions to hold in a
trust "limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue . . . until after
student-athletes leave school.'
'158
Because none of the NCAA's key witnesses, when given the
opportunity to respond, provided any contrary evidence to the NCAA's
ability to implement the trust payment system, the court concluded that,
along with the first alternative, that the second alternative also provided a
less restrictive alternative to compensate student-athletes equal shares of the
licensing revenue generated from the use of their names, images, and
likenesses.'59 A third proposed alternative that would allow for student-
153 Id.
is Id. at 1005 ("Because we hold that the NCAA did not establish evidence of sufficient
procompetitive benefits, we need not address question of whether the plaintiffs were able to
show that comparable procompetitive benefits could be achieved through viable, less
anticompetitive means." (citing Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998)).
"I Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004);
see also Cty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2001) ("As part of
their burden to show the existence of less restrictive alternatives, however, plaintiffs must
also show that 'an alternative is substantially less restrictive and is virtually as effective in
serving the legitimate objective without significantly increased cost."); see also NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) ("Not only do plaintiffs bear the
burden at this step, but the Supreme Court has admonished that we must generally afford the
NCAA "ample latitude" to superintend college athletics."); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d
1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Courts should afford the NCAA plenty of room under the
antitrust laws to preserve the amateur character of intercollegiate athletics.").
1' O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 982-84 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
157 Id. at 982
58 Id. at 983.
159 Id.
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athletes to receive money for endorsements was not determined to offer a
less restrictive way for the NCAA to achieve its stated procompetitive
goals.'6 ° This alternative would threaten the NCAA's ability to protect
student-athletes from the "commercial exploitation."']61
Since the plaintiffs did offer two less restrictive alternatives, Judge
Wilken entered an injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing rules
that do not allow member-institutions to offer FBS football or Division I
men's basketball recruits a share of the revenue generated from the use of
their names, images, and likenesses up to the cost of attendance.' 62 The
rationale behind the ruling is that the rules prohibiting student-athletes from
receiving any compensation for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses violated Section I of the Sherman Act as they restrained "price
competition among FBS football and Division I basketball schools, as
suppliers of the unique combination of educational and athletic
opportunities.. 163 Elite football and basketball recruits sought to attend
these institutions, which restrained trade in the market where the schools
competed "to acquire recruits' athletic services and licensing rights."'' 64 Not
only did the NCAA's procompetitive justifications not justify the restraint,
they could be achieved through less restrictive means. 65
D. 0 'Bannon on Appeal and Going Forward
On appeal, only the less restrictive alternative of awarding student-
athletes a stipend up to the cost of attendance was upheld. 166 NCAA
president, Dr. Mark Emmert, as well as other NCAA witnesses, testified
that "raising the grant-in-aid cap to the cost of attendance would have
virtually no impact on amateurism."' 67 While the court noted that courts
should not use antitrust law to make marginal adjustments to broadly
reasonable market restraints, 16 it was satisfied by the evidence and
testimony from the NCAA, which stated that student-athletes remain
amateurs "as long as any money paid to them goes to cover legitimate
educational expenses."' 69 In regards to the second less restrictive alternative
offered by the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
"clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative" to allow student-athletes to
receive cash payments, such as those in a trust available following
160 Id. at 984.
161 Id.
162 O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
163 Id. at 1007.
1641Id.
165 Id.
16 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
167 Id. at 1075.
11 Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 860 (1st Cir. 1982) (showing that
defendants are "not required to adopt the least restrictive" alternative).16 9O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075.
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graduation, unrelated to educational expenses. 70 It reasoned that a "rule
permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation [with a $5,000
cap]" cannot be as effective as not paying them, which is "precisely what
makes them amateurs."'171 However, it seems as if the Chief Judge Thomas'
dissent is more compelling. In the dissent, Chief Judge Thomas notes
inconsistencies in NCAA rules that allow FBS football players to receive
Pell grants in excess of their cost of attendance figure and Division I tennis
recruits to earn up to $10,000 per year in prize money from athletic
events. 72 While the $5,000 cap to the cash compensation alternative
seemed fairly arbitrary 7 3 , overall, the second less restrictive alternative
should have also been upheld. 174 The evidence provided the district court
with enough information to make a determination. On appeal, the court
reviews the lower court's determinations for clear errors, while being
significantly deferential to the district court's findings. 75 It does not appear
that the Ninth Circuit followed set precedent.
It should be noted that since the beginning of the O'Bannon litigation,
the NCAA and member-institutions have implemented the less restrictive
alternative that awards stipends to student-athletes up to the full cost of
attendance. 76 Each member-institution calculates cost of attendance figures
and has the opportunity to provide aid to its student-athletes up to the
institutional cost of attendance. 77 So, while failing to completely grant
student-athletes legal protection to license rights to their names, images,
and likenesses to third parties, 178 the impact of the O'Bannon decision and
subsequent appeal was pioneering to the extent that it was among the first
to recognize that certain restraints on the NCAA's student-athlete
1701 d. at 1076 (agreeing with the district court regarding the NCAA's two legitimate
procompetitive justifications served by the NCAA's current rules: (I) "preserving the
popularity of the NCAA's product by promoting its current understanding of amateurism"
and (2) "integrating academics and athletics." However, since amateurism is integral to the
NCAA's mission, paying student-athletes even a small amount for use of their names,
images, and likenesses, is not "virtually as effective for that market as being an amateur."
Additionally, the only evidence before the district court contemplated the difference between
the effects of small payments versus large payments and not whether consumer demand
would be affected by paying student-athletes.).
171 Id.
172 ]d. at 1080.
171 Id. at 1076 (the cap was offered as a fairly offhand comment by an NCAA witness. The
NCAA witness, an expert on the issue of whether paying college athletes will negatively
impact consumer demand, mentioned that he was not prepared to "opine on whether pure
cash compensation, of any amount, would affect amateurism.").
174 Id. at 1083.
171 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 549 (9th Cir. 1971); see also
Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2004).
176 Steve Berkowitz &Andrew Kreighbaum, College Athletes Cashing in With Millions in
New Benefits, USA TODAY SPORTS (Aug. 19, 2015, 4:05 PM),
http://www.usatoday.con/story/sports/college/2015/08/I 8/ncaa-cost--attendance-meals-
2015/31904839/.
177 Id.
178 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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compensation model may violate Section I of Sherman Act.' 79 It established
a limited free market for student-athlete services and legal precedent for
future NCAA antitrust challenges.180 The NCAA, just like other business
entities, must continue to find innovative ways to restructure its
compensation model to keep up with the times and society or risk being
eliminated and replaced by a more "progressive system.''
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO NCAA's CURRENT PROHIBITION ON
COMPENSATION BASED ON THE USE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE'S NAMES,
IMAGES, AND LIKENESSES
Historically, athletic scholarships have only provided student-athletes
with enough aid to cover tuition and fees, room and board, and course-
related books. The scholarships did not cover the additional cost of
attendance figures determined by each university's financial aid office.
Aided by the O'Bannon decision, the NCAA and participating universities'
administrations made strides to attempt to quell critiques of their
organizations by implementing an additional cost of attendance stipend.
This stipend provides student-athletes with the difference between
university cost of attendance figures and the historical amount given for
athletic scholarships. Critics of providing the additional amount up to the
cost of attendance have lamented that this additional amount will provide
unfair recruiting advantages. 82 In response to the criticisms, advocates
respond that while some universities might have cost of attendance amounts
well above average, it is important to note that individual athletic
departments do not control the cost of attendance figures and therefore
cannot arbitrarily provide more money in hopes of luring top recruits. 83
A. Allowing the Free Market to Reign Supreme
Some advocates for NCAA reform suggest that reform efforts are
stunted by the misperception that since the majority of student-athletes do
not end up playing professionally, they should not ask for compensation
beyond that provided by a scholarship. However, it could also be argued
that under proposed models, a greater percentage of student-athletes should
' Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in 0 'Bannon v. NCAA: A Small Step
Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 2319, 2363 (2014).
180 Id.
181 Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint For the Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 3
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123, 123 (1993).
182 Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA Preserving Amateurism in College Sports
Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 882-83 (2016).
183 See Jon Solomon, Cost of attendance results: The chase to pay college players, CBS
SPORTS, http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25275500/cost-of-
attendance-results-the-chase-to-legally-pay-college-players (last visited May 4, 2016).
2016
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
be compensated based on their current value to the institution and not their
potential value as a professional athlete. By allowing market forces to work,
the star quarterback on the national championship winning football team
could sign an exclusive deal with Huntington Bank or whatever sponsor
they choose. If the school chooses, it could also pay the quarterback,
despite not being required to.
Critics of this model suggest that major athletic departments such as
Ohio State and Alabama will benefit from the proposed model. However,
these institutions are already benefitting from the current model largely
because of their ability to generate revenue, their large alumni bases, and
their ability to attract top tier recruits.
B. Emulating the Olympic Model with the NCAA
Many NCAA critics have advocated for the NCAA to implement the
so-called Olympic model. In addition to providing an athletic scholarship,
college athletes would receive money based on individual deals, such as
endorsements or autograph signings. This model would allow athletes to
receive whatever the outside market bears benefit while the NCAA would
keep its broadcasting and licensing revenue without having to compensate
players. Criticisms have been leveled at the Olympic model as rogue
boosters could set up fake endorsement deals to funnel money to players.
While this is possible, establishing a clearinghouse to confirm the eligibility
of certain companies to provide commercial opportunities to student-
athletes would provide a starting place. Companies that are currently
NCAA or university sponsors have already been vetted and could begin
providing sponsorship opportunities to student-athletes.
C. Hybrid Solution Allowing Free Market Forces to Interact with
Limitations
Another possible solution to the NCAA's no-pay model that has gained
the most traction is a hybrid model between the Olympic model and the free
market model that restricts the timing of when a student-athlete is allowed
to receive the compensation. So, just as in the Olympic model, student-
athletes would be able to receive compensation based on individual deals.
However, unlike in the Olympic model, institutions would also be able to
compensate student-athletes above and beyond the athletic scholarship, if
they chose to do so. Additionally, the student-athlete would not be able to
receive the compensation until after he or she graduates or no longer
competes for the university. Until that point, the compensation would be
put in a trust, established by the university, for the student-athlete. Upon
graduation or the termination of eligibility, the student-athlete can withdraw
those funds and is free to use them as her or she desires. When those funds
are withdrawn, the student-athlete is no longer eligible to compete as an
amateur in NCAA-sponsored athletic competitions.
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With whatever reform measure the NCAA implements, it must
continue to evolve. The change from the old BCS bowl system to a playoff
system shows some of the willingness of the organization to become more
progressive. 184 However, the switch from the BCS bowl system to the
football playoff system also had the ability to be a more "wildly successful
commercial entity" because of the perception that it was better than its
predecessor18 5 and because of the additional revenue from broadcasting
rights and sponsorship opportunities.'8 6 These additional revenue streams
drive up the payouts given to "Power Five" conferences meeting NCAA
standards. 187 This additional revenue can assist in offsetting the costs of
implementing a compensation model that eliminates unreasonable restraints
on student-athletes' ability to be compensated for the use of their name,
image, and likeness.
VI. CONCLUSION
As exhibited by the O'Bannon decision, there is currently no
unanimously satisfactory solution to address the NCAA's current reluctance
of compensating student-athletes. Through their performances on the
playing field, major college football and basketball student-athletes are
generating millions of dollars for institutions around the country. The
NCAA, individual schools and conferences, marketing and broadcasting
executives, and athletics directors and coaches, among others, are
consistently becoming wealthier at the expense of student-athletes. If the
NCAA wishes to continue operating without continuously being inundated
with antitrust litigation, then it must continue to develop internal reform
measures as alternatives to the current student-athlete compensation
restrictions.
While the general public may want to believe in the fact that student-
athletes play "for the love of the game," the NCAA should no longer be
able to hide behind the theory of amateurism in order to avoid having to
compensate student-athletes while also setting record profit and revenue
numbers. Many critics of the current NCAA model note that the NCAA
will not voluntarily alter its model. Those invested in the model have to
either be willing or forced to change the model. Whether that means that the
NCAA and member institutions will need to uncover additional revenue
18 Jack Wilkinson, Bowl Restructuring Appears Inevitable Meeting in Atlanta Addresses
Issue, But Football Title PlayoffNot Likely, Atlanta Const., May 23, 1994, at D2.
"85 Jacob Pramuk, Playoffs Are a Revenue Bonanza for College Football, NBC NEWS (Jan.
21, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/businessfbusiness-news/playoffs-are-revenue-
bonanza-college-football-n277641.
186 Id. (ESPN paid $7.3 billion over 12 years to secure college Football Playoff broadcasting
rights, tripling the annual fee ESPN paid during the last four years of the BCS. Other
sponsors see the potential for increased exposure highlighted by Dr. Pepper's $35 million
commitment to become a championship partner).187 Id.
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streams or allow for non-athletic department entities to pay student-athletes,
reform is needed.
Starting with the O'Bannon litigation, it appears that forced reform
from the NCAA could be on the horizon. Public perception, court decisions,
current and former student-athletes, and NCAA reform advocates are
gaining ground in their quest to change NCAA no-compensation rules. It
appears evident that the NCAA will no longer be able to skirt around
antitrust regulations by arguing the theory of amateurism to avoid allowing
student-athletes to be compensated.
